اللفظ

The conventional indicative expression signifies the entirety of that for which it was coined by correspondence (muṭābaqah), and its part by inclusion (taḍammun) if it has a part, and what accompanies it in the mind by necessary implication (iltizām), like "human being."

Ọ̀rọ̀ tí ń tọ́ka sí ohun kan nípa ìfohùn-ṣọ̀kan ń tọ́ka sí gbogbo ohun tí a yàn án fún nípa ìbámu (muṭābaqah), àti sí apá rẹ̀ nípa ìfihàn (taḍammun) bí ó bá ní apá kan, àti sí ohun tí ó bá a mu nínú ọkàn nípa ìtẹ̀lé (iltizām), bí "èèyàn."

For it signifies the rational animal by correspondence, one of its two (parts) by inclusion, and the capacity for knowledge and the craft of writing by necessary implication.

Nítorí pé ó ń tọ́ka sí ẹranko onígbọ́n nípa ìbámu, sí ọ̀kan lára wọn (apá méjèèjì) nípa ìfihàn, àti sí àgọ́bá-ìmọ̀ àti iṣẹ́ kíkọ nípa ìtẹ̀lé.

Then the expression is either simple (mufrad): that which does not intend by its part to indicate a part of its meaning, like "human being"; or composite (muʾallaf): that which is not like that, like "throwing stones."

Lẹ́yìn náà, ọ̀rọ̀ náà jẹ́ àyàtọ̀ sí oríṣi méjì: ọ̀rọ̀ àdákọ (mufrad): èyí tí a kò fẹ́ láti fi apá rẹ̀ tọ́ka sí apá ìtumọ̀ rẹ̀, bí "èèyàn"; tàbí ọ̀rọ̀ àkópọ̀ (muʾallaf): èyí tí kò rí bẹ́ẹ̀, bí "jíjú òkúta."

So the simple (term) is either universal (kullī): that whose concept does not prevent participation in it, like "human being"; or particular (juzʾī): that whose concept does prevent that, like "Zayd."

Nítorí náà, ọ̀rọ̀ àdákọ jẹ́ àyàtọ̀ sí oríṣi méjì: ọ̀rọ̀ gbogbogbòò (kullī): èyí tí ìrònú ọkàn rẹ̀ kò dènà ìkópa nínú rẹ̀, bí "èèyàn"; tàbí ọ̀rọ̀ àdámọ́ (juzʾī): èyí tí ìrònú ọkàn rẹ̀ dènà ìyẹn, bí "Zayd."

And the universal is either essential (dhātī): that which enters into the reality of its particulars, like "animal" in relation to human and horse; or accidental (ʿaraḍī): that which is contrary to that, like "laughing" in relation to human.

Ọ̀rọ̀ gbogbogbòò jẹ́ àyàtọ̀ sí oríṣi méjì: ọ̀rọ̀ ìdánilójú (dhātī): èyí tí ó wọ inú òtítọ́ àwọn àkànṣe rẹ̀, bí "ẹranko" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú èèyàn àti ẹṣin; tàbí ọ̀rọ̀ ìjàǹbá (ʿaraḍī): èyí tí ó yàtọ̀ sí ìyẹn, bí "ẹ̀rín" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú èèyàn.

And the essential (universal) is either said in answer to "what is it?" according to pure commonality—like "animal" in relation to human and horse—and it is the genus (jins): defined as that which is predicated of many differing in realities in answer to "what is it?" in an essential manner.

Ọ̀rọ̀ ìdánilójú jẹ́ àyàtọ̀ sí oríṣi: èyí tí a ń sọ ní ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú ìfara-pọ̀ nìkan—bí "ẹranko" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú èèyàn àti ẹṣin—òun ni iran (jins): a túmọ̀ rẹ̀ sí ohun tí a ń sọ fún ọ̀pọ̀ tí ó yàtọ̀ ní àwọn òtítọ́ wọn ní ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?" ní ọ̀nà ìdánilójú.

Or (it is) said in answer to "what is it?" according to both commonality and specificity together—like "human being" in relation to Zayd and ʿAmr—and it is the species (nawʿ): defined as that which is predicated of many differing in number but not in reality in answer to "what is it?"

Tàbí èyí tí a ń sọ ní ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú ìfara-pọ̀ àti àkànṣe pọ̀—bí "èèyàn" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú Zayd àti ʿAmr—òun ni irú (nawʿ): a túmọ̀ rẹ̀ sí ohun tí a ń sọ fún ọ̀pọ̀ tí ó yàtọ̀ ní nọ́ńbà ṣùgbọ́n kì í ṣe ní òtítọ́ wọn ní ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?"

Or (it is) not said in answer to "what is it?" but rather in answer to "what sort of thing is it in its essence?"—and it is that which distinguishes the thing from what shares its genus, like "rational" in relation to human—and it is the differentia (faṣl): defined as that which is predicated of the thing in answer to "what sort of thing is it in its essence?"

Tàbí èyí tí a kì í sọ ní ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?" bí kò ṣe pé a ń sọ ọ́ ní ìdáhùn sí "irú ohun wo ni ó jẹ́ nínú ẹ̀mí ara rẹ̀?"—òun ni èyí tí ń fi ohun ṣe ìyàtọ̀ pẹ̀lú ohun tí ó bá a pín iran, bí "onígbọ́n" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú èèyàn—òun ni ìyàtọ̀ (faṣl): a túmọ̀ rẹ̀ sí ohun tí a ń sọ sí ohun kan ní ìdáhùn sí "irú ohun wo ni ó jẹ́ nínú ẹ̀mí ara rẹ̀?"

And the accidental (universal) is either that which cannot be separated from the essence—and it is the inseparable accident (ʿaraḍ lāzim); or it is not impossible—and it is the separable (accident).

Ọ̀rọ̀ ìjàǹbá jẹ́ àyàtọ̀ sí oríṣi: bóyá kò ṣeé yà kúrò nínú àdáwá (māhiyyah)—òun ni ìjàǹbá aláìyà (ʿaraḍ lāzim); tàbí kò jẹ́ pé kò ṣeé yà—òun ni ìjàǹbá aláyà.

And each of the two is either specific to one reality—and it is the proper accident (khāṣṣah)—like "capable of laughing potentially and actually" for human. And it is defined as a universal that is predicated of what is under a single reality only, in an accidental manner.

Olúkúlùkù méjèèjì jẹ́ àyàtọ̀: bóyá ó kan òtítọ́ kan ṣoṣo—òun ni àkànṣe-ìjàǹbá (khāṣṣah)—bí "agbára ẹ̀rín ní agbára àti ní ìṣe" fún èèyàn. A sì túmọ̀ rẹ̀ sí ohun gbogbogbòò tí a ń sọ sí ohun tí ó wà lábẹ́ òtítọ́ kan ṣoṣo nìkan, ní ọ̀nà ìjàǹbá.