المبحث الثاني

So the simple (term) is either universal (kullī): that whose concept does not prevent participation in it, like "human being"; or particular (juzʾī): that whose concept does prevent that, like "Zayd."

Nítorí náà, ọ̀rọ̀ àdákọ pin sí oríṣi méjì: ọ̀rọ̀ gbogbogbòò (kullī): èyí tí ìrisí agbọye rẹ̀ kò dènà ìkópa míràn nínú rẹ̀, bí "èèyàn"; tàbí ọ̀rọ̀ ìpín (jusʾī): èyí tí ìrònú agbọye rẹ̀ dènà òmíràn, bí "Seidu."

And the universal is either essential (dhātī): that which enters into the reality of its particulars, like "animal" in relation to human and horse; or accidental (ʿaraḍī): that which is contrary to that, like "laughing" in relation to human.

Ọ̀rọ̀ gbogbogbòò yìí náà pin sí oríṣi méjì: ọ̀rọ̀ ìdánilójú (ssātī): èyí tí ó wọ inú pàápàá àwọn ìpín rẹ̀, bí "ẹranko" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú èèyàn àti ẹṣin; tàbí ọ̀rọ̀ (ʿaraḍī): èyí tí ó yàtọ̀ sí ìyẹn, bí "ẹ̀rín" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú èèyàn

And the essential (universal) is either said in answer to "what is it?" according to pure commonality—like "animal" in relation to human and horse—and it is the genus (jins): defined as that which is predicated of many differing in realities in answer to "what is it?" in an essential manner.

Ọ̀rọ̀ ìdánilójú jẹ́ àyàtọ̀ sí oríṣi: èyí tí a ń sọ ní ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú ìfara-pọ̀ nìkan—bí "ẹranko" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú èèyàn àti ẹṣin—òun ni iran (jins): a túmọ̀ rẹ̀ sí ohun tí a ń sọ fún ọ̀pọ̀ tí ó yàtọ̀ ní àwọn òtítọ́ wọn ní ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?" ní ọ̀nà ìdánilójú

Or (it is) said in answer to "what is it?" according to both commonality and specificity together—like "human being" in relation to Zayd and ʿAmr —and it is the species (nawʿ): defined as that which is predicated of many differing in number but not in reality in answer to "what is it?"

Tàbí èyí tí a ń sọ ní ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú ìfara-pọ̀ àti àkànṣe pọ̀—bí "èèyàn" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú Seidu àti ʿAmr —òun ni irú (nawʿ): a túmọ̀ rẹ̀ sí ohun tí a ń sọ fún ọ̀pọ̀ tí ó yàtọ̀ ní òǹkà ṣùgbọ́n kì í ṣe ní pàápàá wọn níbí ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?"

Or (it is) not said in answer to "what is it?" but rather in answer to "what sort of thing is it in its essence?"—and it is that which distinguishes the thing from what shares its genus, like "rational" in relation to human —and it is the differentia (faṣl): defined as that which is predicated of the thing in answer to "what sort of thing is it in its essence

Tàbí èyí tí a kì í sọ nípa ìdáhùn sí "kí ni?" bí kò ṣe pé a ń sọ ọ́ ní ìdáhùn sí "irú ohun wo ni ó jẹ́ nínú ẹ̀mí ara rẹ̀?"—òun ni èyí tí ń fi ohun ṣe ìyàtọ̀ pẹ̀lú ohun tí ó bá a pín iran, bí "ọ̀lọ́gbọ́n" ní ìbámu pẹ̀lú èèyàn —òhun ní a n pè ní Ìyàtọ̀ (faṣl): a túmọ̀ rẹ̀ sí ohun tí a ń sọ sí nkan ní ìdáhùn sí "irú ohun wo ni ó jẹ́ nínú ẹ̀mí ara rẹ̀?"